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IN THE SUPRE~IB COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
District Court No. 2433 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Supreme Court No. 14636 
RICKY JOE ARCHULETTA, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND 
APPELLANT, RICKY JOE ARCHULETTA 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a case in which defendant-appellant seeks a 
reversal of the Second Judicial District Court's denial of 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Suppression of 
Evidence and Motion for a New Trial. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The defendant was arraigned before the Second Judicial 
District Court of Davis County, State of Utah on March 30, 
1976, at which time, trial was set for April 30, 1976 at 
9:00 a.m. which trial setting was vacated and rescheduled 
for June 9, 1976. Defendant filed his Motion for an 
Earlier Trial Date on the 3rd day of May, 1976 and when 
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said trial date was not given at an earlier date, a 
Motion to Dismiss was filed on June 3, 1976 but due to 
the date of the filing of said Motion and its having been 
filed less than a week prior to trial, no hearing was 
held upon the said Motion until the trial of June 9, 
1976.Because there had been no hearing prior to trial, 
the Court denied defendant's Motion for dismissal. 
On April 19, 1976, defendant-appellant filed his Motion 
to Suppress Evidence on the grounds that he had signed a 
statement which constituted a confession and admission when, 
in fact, he could not read or write the English language and 
further basing said Motion upon the fact that he was in-
toxicated and drunk from alcoholic beverages at the time of 
the signing of the said confession. Said Motion was again 
made at the time of trial and reserved during the continu~nce 
of the trial and later denied by the Court. 
During the course of the trial, defendant's mother, Mrs. 
Pr:isdlla Flores, testified under cross-examination by the 
State, stating that the defendant had been in prison and 
based upon that, the defendant moved for a new trial. No 
decision order issued as a result of that motion and the 
defendant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a 
period of one to fifteen years. Counsel for the defendant, 
who has been appointed by the Court, filed a Notice of Appeal 
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on the 17th day of June, 1976 and then filed his Notice of 
Withdrawal. The defendant himself filed a Notice of Appeal 
in his own handwriting on the 7th of July, 1976 and it is 
pursuant to those Notices of Appeal that this matter is 
brought before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
Concurrent with the filing of the Notice of Appearance by 
counsel was the filing of a Designation of Record on Appeal 
which, in part, asked for a transcript to be prepared at 
County expense on behalf of defendant-appellant which was 
resisted by the County so that due to the failure of the 
County to appoint an attorney or otherwise provide repre-
sentation and the delays associated with defense counsel's 
attempt to enforce the provision for the defendant of a 
transcript, defendant has been in prison since June 9, 1976 
to the present time and had not received a transcript of 
the trial itself until October 3, 1977. For this reason, 
a Complaint for Writ of Habeas Corpus accompanies the brief 
herein. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant asks that the judgments of the lower 
Court be reversed with respect to the Motion to Dismiss, the 
Motion to Suppress Evidence and the Motion for a New Trial and 
further that defendant be granted the relief sought in his 
-3-
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Complaint for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
March 30, 1976, &efendant was arraigned on a charge 
of burglary and trial was scheduled for April 30, 1976, 
for which notice was mailed to counsel. (R 10, 11) There-
after, the trial was continued from April 30, 1976 to 
June 9, 1976 and notice thereon filed May 4, 1976. (R 15). 
Defendant's counsel learned that the matter would be continued and 
filed the notion for the defendant for an earlier trial date on May 3, 
1976, making the said demands under U.C.A. 77-1-8 (6) (1953) 
claiming a constitutional right to a speedy trial under 
Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution. (R 14) 
Notwithstanding the said Notice and Motion for an Earlier 
Trial Date, June 9, 1976 continued to be the scheduled time 
of defendant's trial. June 3, 1976, defendant filed his Motion to 
Dismiss the Complaint against him; said Motion filed with 
Memorandum in Support thereof. (R 16, 18) The Motion was again 
made before the Court on the day of trial at the beginning thereof but 
the Court did not make any decisions thereon until later on 
in the trial but reserving to the plaintiff the right to make 
any motions that he desired later on in the trial. 
On April 19, 1976, the month following the arraignment 
of the defendant, defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence (R 12) 
-4-
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basing said Motion upon the fact that the defendant had at 
the time of the investigation of the matter, while he was 
drunk from alcoholic beverages had given a statement of 
confession to the crime, but more importantly, the confession 
admissions were reduced to writing and the defendant had 
signed the said confession notwithstanding the fact that he 
could not read or write anything but his own name. 
During the course of trial, defendant's mother, 
Priscilla Flores, was called to the witness stand and during 
her testimony, while she was being cross-examined by the 
State, stated that the defendant had been in prison. (Tr. 117, 
ln. 24-25) Because of that statement, the defendant filed a 
Motion for a New Trial on the 18th day of June, 1976. ~ 59) 
Defendant's Notio= of Appeal was timely filed and at the same time, 
defense counsel's Notice of Withdrawal. (R 56, 58 & 63). Plaintiff 
awaited in prison from June 17, 1976 until March 3, 1977 for the appoint-
ment of another attorney and subsequent to the appointment of Lyle J. 
Barnes, Esq. as counsel by the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah who then filed a Designation of Record on Appeal. (R 68) 
Defendant waited from March 3, 1976 until October 3, 1976 for the 
transcript of record which was a time during which counsel 
for the defendant and the Court and counsel for the State, 
together with Mr. Loren Martin, negotiated the question of 
transcript and whether or not said transcript should be 
-5-
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prepared and made available without cost to the defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING WHO IS 
HELD OR INCARCERATED IN JAIL AWAITING TRIAL 
AND HAS BEEN HELD BEYOND THIRTY DAYS IN SAID 
CONFINEMENT FOLLOIHNG ARRAIGNMENT AND FOLLOWING 
HIS DEMAND FOR AN EARLIER TRIAL DATE, MAY NOT 
BE TRIED AND CONVICTED. 
The controling law governing the disposition of 
plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss is Article 1, Section 12 of 
the Constitution of Utah which reads: 
In criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the 
right to ... have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the County or District in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed ... 
Also controling is U.C.A. 77-1-8(6): 
Rights of the Defendant. In criminal prosecutions, 
the defendant is entitled: (6) to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county 
in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed; and every defendant in a criminal action 
unable to get bail shall be entitled to a trial 
within thirty (30) days after arraignment, if the 
court is then in session in such county, otherwise, 
the trial of such defendant shall be called on the 
next day of the next succeeding session of the 
court. 
These legal requirements have been qualified so that 
a defendant must request for trial in order to take 
advantage of the guarantee of the trial within thirty days. 
State vs. Bohn, 47 UT. 362, 248 P. 19. On the other hand, 
-6-
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the defendant is entitled to a dismissal if, in fact, he 
makes the request and is not tried within thirty days as 
required by the statutes. State vs. Lozano, 23 UT. 2d, 
312, 462 P.2d 710. 
POINT II 
WHERE THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS UNABLE TO 
READ OR WRITE THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND WAS 
OTHERWISE UNABLE TO FULLY UNDERSTAND WHAT 
HE WAS DOING ANY CONFESSION OR ADMISSION 
TRANSCRIBED OR ORALLY SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
SUPPRESSED. 
Early in the proceedings on April 19, 1976, plaintiff 
filed his Motion to Suppress Evidence relating to a certain 
transcribed oral confession or admission given by the defendant-
appellant to the police officers are Clearfield on the 8th day 
of February, 1976. At that time, a statement was extracted/ 
On page 2 of the transcript of his statement, we read: 
Q: This was after you had returned to the Delgado residence 
to burglarize it and gone back to town? 
A. Yes. 
In that statement, the defendant-appellant was asked informa-
tion regarding burglary of which he is not legally capable or 
competent to understand and this, together with the fact that 
he was, in fact, a Spanish-American speaking poor English 
and unable to read and write the English language was a 
rather prejudicial statement and may have been one in which 
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he himself was unable to understand or effectively evaluate 
at the time he answered in the affirmative. There was 
evidence before the Court that he has been drinking that 
day. The direct testimony of Angelo Cabrero, who was with 
the defendant at the time that he was taken to the police 
station on the day of the admissions as indicated herein, 
testified as follows: 
Q. On the 17th day of February, 1976, did you have 
occasion to transport Mr. Ricky Archuletta to 
the Farmington Sheriff's Office? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And who's car did you come in? 
A. My car. 
Q. Who was present with you? 
A. Jose Flores, Ricky and myself. 
Q. Now, at the time that you took him to the 
police station, could you explain anything 
unusual about his demeanor or his character 
at that time? 
A. Yes, sir. That morning I got up there early, 
and I went down next door and we bought a case 
of beer and sat drinking. two o'clock, he 
told me he had to go some place and he needed a 
ride. I said, "Okay" so we kept drinking, and 
then about 1:30 we left. 
And I left with .. Ricky, and we came early, and 
I left him there at the police station. We 
waited there for awhile, for an hour, you know 
like from 2:00 until about 4:30, then they told 
us we could go. Ricky wasn't going to go, 
Ricky was not going to go with us no more. 
Q. When you got to the Sheriff's Office, what effect 
if any, did the drinking have upon Mr. Archuletta. 
A. Well, he went straight and sit down. And then he 
would stqnd up again, and looking for somebody. 
Then he just wait, and then sit down for awhile. 
Then five minutes later, you know, a policeman 
came in and took him in. 
Q. Was he drunk when you got there? 
A. To my knowledge, he was pretty, you know, pretty 
affected. 
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Q. \~el 1, what did the liquor have to do with it, 
--how did he feel from that, anything? 
A. Oh, I don't know how he feels, I know how he 
looked. 
Q. llow did he look? 
A. Like-- I couldn't explain. When you drink about--
I don't know how to explain it. Awful. Not 
awful, but I mean--
Q. Are you having a rough time speaking the language? 
A. Yes, I do. 
*** 
Q. Is it your testimony that he was drunk when you 
got there? 
A. Yes, sir. (T. pgs. 58-59) 
From the testimony of Jose Flores who also accompanied 
him on that trip to the police station, we read: 
Q. Were you present at any time during any consumption 
of alcoholic beverage or--
A. Yah. They were drinking in front of my porch. 
Q. Did you then later--how long did that occur. How 
long did that take place. That drinking. 
A. How long? 
Q. Yes. 
A. For a few hours. 
Q. Then were you with them when they went to the 
Clearfield Police Department? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is'this the last time you saw Ricky as far as 
until later, when you went to the preliminary 
hearing. 
A. Yah. 
Q. As you got to the Clearfield Police Department, 
what was his condition? Could you describe that? 
A. Drunk. 
The second defect in admitting the statement of the 
defendant which was transcribed and signed by the defendant 
is the fact that the officers knew at the time that the 
statement was extracted that the defendant was unable to 
read and write the English language. On vore dire exa~ina-
tion, Officer Bud De Ryke testified as follows: 
-9-
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Q. A fEW rrore questions about this: You indicated 
that he had some problem being able to under-
stand statements being put to him. Is that 
what you said earlier? 
A. We felt he might have. 
Q. And its your testimony that he could not read. 
A. That's correct. That's what he stated to us. 
The above evidences indicate that defendant-appellant 
was unable to make a valid statement. First, because he 
could not understand the meaning of burglarize and answered 
in the affirmative. It was his testimony and that of others, 
that he was merely picking up items which had previously 
been given to Mr. Archuletta, the defendant-appellant for 
the purposes of paying a fine. Mr. Delgado, however, upon 
learning later that a Ralph Gomez, a companion of Mr. 
Archuletta was also benefiting from the items, then reneged 
on the deal and wanted to charge the individuals Ralph Gomez 
and Mr. Archuletta with burglary. It is obvious that if Mr. 
Archuletta was unable to understand the word burglary or 
"burglarizing" and attached to that, the meaning only that 
he picked up the items from his relative, Mr. Delgado, who 
now reneged on the offer and himself being willing to cooperate 
with Delgado, the statement given by himself as Sranish-American 
unable to read and write and further to fully understand the 
English language would be a highly prejudicial statement 
-10-
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and could be interpreted by the jury as being an admission 
of the part of the defendant-appeallant when, in fact, it 
was not. Nevertheless, as this Motion to Suppress was 
brought up during trial, the Court overruled the Motion 
and admitted the sworn statement. (R-53) 
Under the circumstances, there is a considerable 
question as to whether or not defendant-appellant gave a 
voluntary statement. In the case of State vs. Revera, 
94 Ariz. 45, 381 P.2d 584 (1963) there is a demonstration of 
what should be done in order to make certain that a 
defendant-appeallant, such as Mr. Archuletta, fully under-
stands the statement that he is giving. In that case, the 
defendant was unable to read, speak or understand the 
English language and a Spanish translator was brought in 
who then provided the translation so that there would be 
no question but what each word given in the statement would 
be understood. Because of the caution that was exercised 
in that case, the Court held that the written statement taken 
was admissible although the weight thereof could be effected 
by the fact that the English language had to be translated. 
In the case at bar, there were complicated words which no-
one could be certain that Mr. Archuletta understood said 
words. One could reasonably assume from the circumstances 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that Mr. Archuletta did not consider his act to have been 
a crime but merely a possession and sale of goods that the 
giver now has reneged on, unless of course, Mr. Archuletta 
could understand the word "burlarized." 
POINT III 
WHERE THE PROSECUTION ON CROSS-EXAMINATION 
ELICITED FROM DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S MOTHER, 
PRICILLA FLORES, THE STATEMENT THAT THE 
DEFENDAL~T-APPELLANT HAD BEEN IN PRISON, SAID 
STATEMENT WAS PREJUDICIAL AND GROUNDS FOR A 
NEW TRIAL. 
During trial, the defendant's mother, Pricilla Flores, 
was called to the witness stand and testified as follows: 
Q. I see now, Ricky is over thirty years of age. Has 
he worked at all during this period of time? 
A. Yah. Not too much, because he was, he was in 
prison. 
This statement was made before a jury and would have 
the effect of tainting the the character of the defendant-
appellant, securing a conviction against him. Under the rules 
of evidence, the prosecution was successful in creating character 
evidence which is proscribed unless character is, in fact, an 
issue created by the defendant-appellant and constitutes a 
reversible error on the part of the prosecution. Rule 47 of 
the Rules of Evidence adopted effective July 1, 1971 reads as 
follows: 
Subject to Rule 48, when a trait of a person's character 
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is relevant as tending to prove his conduct on a 
specified occasion, such trait may be proved in 
the same manner as provided by Rule 46, except 
that ... (b) any criminal action evidence of a trait 
of an accused character as tending to prove his 
guilt or innocence of the offense charged, (i) may 
not be excluded by a Judge under Rule 45 if offered 
by the accused to prove his innocence, and (ii) if 
offered by the prosecution to prove his guilt, may 
be admitted only after the accused has introduced 
evidence of his good charater. 
No objection was made at the time because to do so 
would only further dramatize the situation and would leave 
no question in the minds of the jury what was said. As it 
was, there was hope that maybe the jury did not hear it. 
The most that an objection could have accomplished would 
have been for the Court to say in essence that that should 
be stricken from the record and from the minds of the jury 
which anyone would know would be an impossibility. Never-
theless, said evidence was made part of the trial and the 
defendant's character was brought into question and tainted 
by the prosecution and this could constitute grounds for a 
new trial. 
POINT IV 
TIIERE ARE TWO ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT, 
RICKY JOE ARCHULETTA BEING GRANTED A WRIT OF HABEAS 
CORPUS AT THIS TIME. (1) BECAUSE THE COURT DID NOT 
BRING HIM TO TRIAL WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED BY 
STATUTE AND IN SO DOING, HAD NO JURISDICTION TO HAVE 
TRIED THE DEFENDANT IN THE FIRST PLACE. (2) DEFENDANT 
SUFFERED AS A RESUL'I' OF HIS INABILITY TO PAY FOR A 
TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL UNTIL THE COURT WAS FINALLY 
PERSUADED TO GRANT THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE TRIAL WHICH 
FORCED TIIE DEFENDANT TO A\~AIT IN PRISON FOR ANY ACTION 
AT ALL UPON HIS CASE. 
-13-
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(1) Failure to Bring the Case to Trial Within the Time 
Prescribed by Law 
Article 1, secion 12 of the Constitution of Utah 
requires that an accused will have a "speedy public trial 
by an impartial jury. U.C.A. 77-1-8 (6) requires that 
a.ny defendant who is unable to get bail is entitled to a 
trial within thirty days after arraignment. As indicated 
above, in the State vs. Bond case 67 Ut. 362, 248 P.19 has 
modified that stating that the application of the above 
statute is made only where request is made and trial is not 
granted within thirty days. See also State vs. Lozano, 23 
Ut. 2d 312, 462 P.2d 710. 
One of the remedies available to the defendant is a 
'l)J'rit of Habeas Corpus issuing from this Supreme Court. In 
39 Am. Jur. 2d, Habeas Corpus, Section 51, we read: 
Subject to some authority to the contrary, and to 
some difference of opinion as to where the 
application for the Writ should be made, Habeas 
Corpus lies for relief of one who is entitled to 
be discharged because of failure to bring the case 
to trial within the time prescribed by law. 
Again, defendant was arraigned March 30. (R 10) The 
first trial setting was April 30 (R 11). Counsel was told a 
few days before at the trial that the trial would not be held 
on April 30, at which time, plaintiff filed a new motion on 
May 30, 1976 for a New Trial Date. (R 14) Notwithstanding 
this demand, a trial setting issued May 4 for June 9, 1976 
which continued to be the trial date through to June 3, 1976 
when plaintiff, by and through his attorney, Lyle J. Barnes, 
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filed a Motion to Dismiss (R 16) with the Memorandum in 
Support thereof. (R 18) A Motion to Dismiss was taken up on 
the 9th day of June at the time of trial and denied by the 
Court on the grounds that it was not noticed up for hearing 
before the Court. (R 53) 
It is obvious that the defect could have been cured 
any time after the filing of a Motion for an Earlier Trial 
Date which was in effect a demand for an earlier trial date 
and plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss because of that failure to 
provide an earlier trial date was filed June 3 and this was 
less than one week prior to trial. 
Prior to the time of trial, Judge Swan's Clerk, Jane 
Johnson, had had telephone conversations with defense counsel 
and was aware of the fact that the delayed trial date was 
unacceptable. While there was some question about an earlier 
date having been offered which counsel had no recall of one 
having been made, said offer was for the 3rd of June, which 
would have been in excess of thirty days even so. See Tr. pgs. 
89-90. It is clear that in either event, a trial was not pro-
vided within thirty days as required by the statute notwith-
standing the fact that a demand had been made. 
In all cases, a Writ of Habeas Corpus must follow prior 
motions in the trial court for discharge. 58 ALR 1514. See 
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also People vs. Wilson, 60 Cal. 2d 139, 32 Cal Rp. 44, 383 
P.2d 452; Ra~der v~eople, 138 Colo. 397, 334, P.2d 437. 
The convicted defendant, however, has the choice or option 
to proceed immediately by habeas corpus after a denial of 
his Motion to Dismiss or to reserve the question as one of 
the grounds of appeal if convicted. Ex pa rte, .Meadows, 71 
Okla. Crim. 353, 112 P2d 419; 21 Am. Jur 2d Crim. Law Section 256, p. 295 note i. i 
(2) Delay in Acquiring Transcript of Record 
Differences in access to the instruments 
needed to vindicate legal rights, when 
based upon the financial situation of the 
defendant, are repugnant to the Constitution, 
and therefore, Habeas Corpus is available to 
enforce the right of an indigent defendant to 
transcripts of the proceedings, so as to enable 
him effectively to defend himself. 39 Am. Jur. 
2d Habeas Corpus, Section 50. 
The Designation of. Record on Appeal was filed March 
3, 1977, nine months following the trial herein, together 
with the Notice of Appearance of Counsel, together with 
Defendant's Affidavit of Impecuniosity. (R. 67, 68, 71) 
At that time, it became necessary for counsel to file 
a Motion for Extension of Time for Filing Desigation of 
Record on Appeal (R 72) because under the rules, defendant 
would be deprived of his right to appeal because of having 
failed to prosecute said appeal which was signed by Order of 
the Court filed July 21, 1977. (R 73) Counsel was appointed 
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by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah because the 
Davis County refused or otherwise neglected to do so. The 
Designation of Record on Appeal included a request for 
transcript of the trial. In the Order which was submitted 
(R 73) pursuant to the Motion for Extension of Time, item 
#2 thereon required a transcript for trial in the matter be 
provided defense counsel. S3id Order,dated the 15th day of 
March 1977,was not filed until July 21, 1977, approximately 
two days prior to a hearing called by Court, at which time, 
the Court granted a transcript requiring counsel for the 
defendant to advise the reporter of the portion of the 
transcript that is needed. Thereafter, on August 5, 1977 
counsel for the defendant filed a Designation of Transcript 
(R 75) which was finally completed and billed for against the 
County on September 27, 1977. From the foregoing, it is 
apparent that there was a great deal of resistance both as 
to the calling of an attorney and to the preparation and 
providing of a transcript for the defendant and the defendant 
waited from June 17, 1976 until September 26, 1977, a period 
of a year and three months, just to proceed with his appeal 
because of the fact that he, as an indigent, was unable to 
pay his way as some other person would have under similar 
circumstances. 
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The Supreme Court in the case of Roberts vs. Lavallee, 
' 389 U. S. 40, 19 Law Ed. 2d 41, 88 S.Ct. 194 (1967) issued 
the following rule: 
"Our decisions for more than a decade now have 
made clear that differences in access to the 
instruments needed to vindicate legal rights, 
when based upon the financial situation of the 
defendant, are repugnant to the Constitution ... 
but to interpose any financial consideration 
between an indigent prisoner of the State and 
his exercise of a state right to sue for his 
liberty is to deny that prisoner the equal pro-
tection of the laws. We have no doubt that the 
New York statute struck down by the New York 
Court of Appeals in Montgomery, as applied to 
deny a free transcript to an indigent, could not 
meet the test of our prior decisions." 
While the transcript was finally provided by the 
District Court, it was after much delay, both as to the 
providing of an attorney on appeal and as to providing the 
free transcript and for a period of time, constituting a 
year and three months, the defendant languished in prison 
with no recourse at all and now should be given his freedom 
because he has been unconstitutionally denied equal protection 
of the law. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Article 1, Section 12 of the Constitution of 
Utah and U.C.A. 77-1-8 (6), the District Court of Davis 
County, State of Utah lost jurisdiction over the defendant 
and did not, in fact, have the right to proceed in trial· 
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but should have dismissed the matter against the defendant-
appellant and the plaintiff in Complaint for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus on file herewith. Having failed in that, the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah should reverse the decision 
denying appellant's Motion to Dismiss issued on the 9th day 
of June, 1976 and that failing, the Supreme Court should 
issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus for the same reason. 
At trial, the use of the appellan~s statement at 
the Clearfield Police Department which was written and signed 
by appellant when said appellant was at the time under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor and a Spanish-American unable 
to read, write and speak the English language or fully 
understand its terms and meanings (especially with respect 
to "burglarizing") and the use of said statements before the 
Court notwithstanding those facts ccnstituted reversible error 
and the use of testimony by Mrs. Flores elicited by the prose-
cution as to character evidence describing defendant having 
been incarcerated in prison, all constitutes reasons for a new 
trial which was denied~ plaintiff on June 9 during trial. 
DATED this _ _j~day of November, 1977. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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